Received: September 15, 2020
Accepted: February 24, 2021
In this paper, I use a theoretical framework inspired by Simondon to analyze the closed fuel cycle strategy implemented by the French nuclear industry in the 1970's. I confront the technocratic conception of technical ensembles, which sees them as the instantiation of a power over nature, with their technological understanding as systems of operations, i.e., points of mediation between technical invention and the natural environment. I argue that the closed fuel cycle strategy can be understood as relying on an imaginary ecology. I propose here a form of critical epistemology, which I compare with Jasanoff's theory of sociotechnical imaginaries, leading to a sociopolitical comprehension of the social efficiency and motives of such a representation. Finally, I question the complementarity conditions between those two frameworks, one normative and the other explanatory.
Keywords: Closed fuel cycle, philosophy of technology, nuclear industry.
En este artículo, analizo la política del «ciclo de combustible cerrado» aplicada por la industria nuclear francesa en los años 70 utilizando un marco teórico inspirado en Simondon. Contrasto la concepción tecnocrática de los conjuntos técnicos como la instanciación de un poder sobre la naturaleza, con la comprensión por parte de los técnicos de los sistemas de operaciones, es decir, puntos de mediación entre la invención técnica y el entorno natural. Sostengo que la política francesa del «ciclo del combustible cerrado» puede entenderse como apoyada en una ecología imaginaria. Para ello, propongo un enfoque de epistemología crítica, contrastada con la teoría de los imaginarios sociotécnicos de Jasanoff, que permite dar cuenta de la eficacia y las motivaciones sociales y políticas de dicha representación. Por último, cuestiono las condiciones de complementariedad entre estos dos modos de análisis, uno normativo y otro explicativo.
Palabras clave: ciclo de combustible cerrado, filosofía de la tecnología, industria nuclear.
In France, most residues produced by the nuclear industry are not considered “waste” but “materials” that can be recovered
What representation of technique is at work in this imaginary ecology? I will first try to propose an answer based on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of technology. In his book entitled Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (henceforth MEOT),
In the case that interests us here, the survival of such an imaginary ecology would be incomprehensible if it were not for the fact that there are sociopolitical issues at stake, such as the unification of the French industry around common goals or its stand regarding accusations of poor waste management. To shed light on this technopolitical aspect, I will call upon Sheila Jasanoff's theory of sociotechnical imaginaries, which leads me to the following question: under what conditions can the normative approach of the epistemology of technology and the descriptive and explanatory approach of STS be compatible?
A Simondonian framework of analysis
The MEOT, first published in 1958, has been rediscovered quite recently (
My aim here is not to present a systematic exposé of Simondon’s theory but to formulate a framework of analysis using some of the conceptual tools it provides. The core of this proposal could be summarized as follows:
Function and functioning
To understand this theory, one must consider a key distinction in Simondon's philosophy of technology: the individuality of technical objects does not lie in their function (i.e., their external purpose) but in their functioning (i.e., their internal operation). A function-based identification is superficial insofar as objects of different nature can serve the same purpose (a hydroelectric turbine and a photovoltaic panel supply electricity), while those with very similar structures can have different uses (a pressurized water nuclear reactor can produce electrogenic energy or propel a submarine). Function, on the one hand, derives from a requirement that is heterogeneous to the proper order of the technical reality and is informed by social and economic factors. Functioning, on the other hand, is the result of a process of individuation specific to technical objects, which Simondon refers to as “concretization”. This individuation is marked by moments of structural reconfiguration—acts of invention—, which help to solve problems by bringing greater coherence between the elements and the “associated environment”. The machine—a concept that Simondon reformulates as a partially self-regulated “technical individual”—is a metastable moment of a lineage, whose intrinsic configuration (the causal system of functioning) can be understood in terms of the problems it has solved. Thus, the distinction between function and functioning, along with the theory of concretization, allows for an identification of the right zone of technicality.
The technocrat and the technician
The critical side of the MEOT, as well as the most complete exposition of Simondon’s theory of alienation, is found in its second part (entitled Man and the technical given). Here, I will mainly focus on Simondon's critique of what he calls “technocratic philosophy”, which he claims is rooted in a certain way of relating no longer to individuals but to technical ensembles. An ensemble designates the superior level of the technical reality, where different individuals are placed in a relation of regulation without being integrated within a new self-regulated individual. An example of this could be a nuclear power plant grouping together individuals like reactors, turbines, and cooling pumps. The term, however, can also refer to broader realities, such as an electricity distribution network.
The understanding of ensembles entails an opposition that can be summarized in two figures: the technician and the industrial organizer
… the industrialist, like the worker, is driven by the finality: he aims at the result; their alienation lies in this. The technician is the man of the operation under way; he assumes, rather than the direction, the self-regulation of the ensemble in operation (Simondon, 2012, p. 176 ).
This alienated representation of the organizer provides the point of view that gives rise to what Simondon calls, in the continuation of this passage, the “autocratic philosophy of techniques” and the “technocratic philosophy”
The operation as mediation against the power over nature
The critique of technocratic philosophy takes up a motif that provides the backbone of the MEOT: the representation of finalism of technical objects is alienating insofar as it masks the authentic locus of technicality. In the conclusion part of the book, this locus is redefined as consisting of operations. Simondon intends to substitute —to the hylemorphist ontology which understands the technical activity as imposition of form to an inert matter—, an ontological determination of the technical objects as systems of operations where form and matter exist at the same level within a “stable mixture of human and natural”. It is this mediation, this mixture of technical invention and nature, that is obscured by the technocratic conception, which sees technical ensembles as the instantiation of a power over nature. The obscurity of the operation has become, with industrialization, the obscurity of the machine: “man knows what goes into the machine and what comes out of it but not what is done in it”, and “to command is still to remain external to what one commands” (
Beyond the relation to technical objects, the ecological relation between human activity and the natural environment is biased in the technocratic conception of the industrial organizer. This leads to a paradox: while technical ensembles are praised as vectors of human power over nature, they also mask the conditions of possibility. This is perhaps the main point to keep in mind in the case that follows, which concerns the valorization of residues from the nuclear industry.
Case analysis: “surgénération” and the “nuclear fuel cycle”
In the 1970s, France embarked on a massive nuclear power building plan, which led to the construction of most of the 58 reactors that are currently in operation
My argument is as follows: “surgénération” does not designate a technical operation but a technocratic power; therefore, the discourses on surgénération offer a distorted representation of the technical reality of the irradiated material processing network. Firstly, surgénération designates an energetic and economic function rather than a technical operation. Secondly, the discourse on surgénération, centered on the production of new energy materials in FBRs, minimizes the constraints specific to the regulatory relations that govern the technical ensemble formed by the irradiated material treatment network. Finally, I will argue that the discourses on FBRs and on the fuel cycle are based on an imaginary ecology that provides a distorted representation of the relations between the nuclear industrial activity and its environment.
Surgénération is not a technical operation
FBRs were established in the 1960s as the keystone of the surgénération system: only they are able to complete the “fuel cycle” by making the best use of the recovered plutonium and uranium-238. This has to do with their functioning, which must be understood in relation to that of other nuclear reactors. In these reactors, generating a chain reaction based on uranium or enriched uranium fuel requires the use of a moderating element, which maximizes the chances of fission by “slowing down” the neutrons. In most French reactors launched in the 1970s, this element is pressurized water. Nevertheless, the moderator will also capture part of the neutrons emitted by fission and minimize the absorption of neutrons by uranium-238 and, thus, the quantity of plutonium-239 that is formed. FBRs must, therefore, respond to the following technical problem: generating fission without a moderator. Most nuclear-powered countries, including France, have opted to use (i) liquid sodium as a coolant, which allows the energy emitted by fission to be transferred without practically capturing neutrons, and (ii) a plutonium-based fuel, which, besides being more fissile than uranium, makes it possible to do so without the use of a moderator. This creates a supply constraint: in order to produce plutonium in interesting quantities, a plutonium stock is required. From a Simondonian point of view, FBRs are, then, technical individuals who bring together three elements (plutonium-based fuel, liquid sodium, and “fertile blankets” of uranium-238), whose genesis can be traced back to the resolution of a parasitic absorption problem that occurs in reactors with “thermal neutrons”
Nonetheless, these reactors were, at least during the 1970s, much more often designated by their surgénérateur potential rather than by their technical functioning. This primacy of function over operation may seem quite normal from a sociological perspective, in that it is, above all, a matter of motivating substantial investments (we will come back to this later). However, the point I want to raise here is that the discourses on FBRs are not strictly speaking technical in a Simondonian sense. In fact, the presentations of surgénération frequently use an energetic and economic register. Let us illustrate this with a few examples:
The essential advantage of these surrégénérateurs is that they consume not only the part of U235 contained in natural U but also most U238. Hence, under these conditions, one ton of natural U may be equal to more than 500,000 tons [...] of coal (Commission Consultative pour la Production d’Électricité d’Origine Nucléaire [PEON], 1964 ).The first effect of surgénération is, of course, to considerably increase the amount of energy resources that can be extracted from uranium, either because of its better intrinsic use or because of the indirect effect of a reduced economic impact of natural uranium on the final cost of electricity. This reduction allows for the exploitation of much poorer deposits, thus increasing the number of available reserves (
PEON, 1970 ).Ultimately, this means that all uranium, U235 and U238 combined, may be used as fuel, thereby increasing our fuel supply at least 100 times. Let us translate this into financial terms: if we use a ton of natural uranium that is 100 times better, we can pay 100 times more for it at the same cost of use (
Bienvenu, 1999 ).
The first two quotations were taken from reports by the PEON commission (
The “fuel cycle” between the power to generate energy materials and a fragile technical ensemble
FBRs are not the only technical individuals in operation. The supply of plutonium necessary to feed them and the recovery of the plutonium they produce depend on a large ensemble of technical individuals, with reprocessing facilities being the main ones. Reprocessing—a technique of military origin
From a Simondonian perspective, this can be summarized as follows: the promoters of the nuclear industry are in the position of organizers of a technical ensemble. They consider it from the point of view of its expected result, i.e., its energetic potential (to provide the fuel of the future) and economic potential (to position France on the fuel market). As a result, they ignore ensembles, collections of interconnected technical individuals, whose regulatory relations are handled by technicians. To find the expression of such a technical point of view, one can look at nuclear safety. Its role is to ensure the proper functioning of facilities and guarantee that the risks they pose are maintained at acceptable levels
These facilities must, after all, deal with the properties of an exceptional material. The irradiated residue will require technical precautions to be implemented, which will weaken the idea of FBRs carrying alone the power to generate energy materials. I will focus on two cases: cooling and criticality safety.
Irradiated fuel assemblies contain fission products, some of which are highly radioactive and continue to emit energy in the form of heat. This “release of residual power” constitutes one of the central technical problems regarding the safety of the “cycle”. From a Simondonian point of view, it represents a technical constraint that may call into question the stability of the ensembles. It also illustrates the technical perspective of safety in its tension with technocratic aims: the energy potential of the fuel becomes a risk to be contained. The French nuclear industry opted for a strategy of pool storage (
The construction of SuperPhénix24 will provide us with the elements necessary for the launching of a first series of large fast breeder plants. The rate at which these are to be commissioned will logically be based on the immediate use of plutonium produced by slow neutron plants (p. 8).
Aside from the constraints related to cooling (which affect most industrial facilities), the handling of irradiated materials poses a more specific problem: the risk of criticality
Considering this constraint, it is impossible to adopt a “control by mass”, i.e., a set of administrative procedures to limit the quantity present in the facilities (
As we can see, the constraints of irradiated material processing operations are reluctant to the materialization of a power to generate artificial energy materials in industrial production. Even more, the technocratic demands for results (efficiency and profitability) are in tension with the work recommended by safety technicians.
The imaginary ecology of the nuclear industry
This distorted representation of technical ensembles encompasses a misunderstanding of the relation between the activity of the nuclear industry and its environment. The power to generate energy materials intends to combine the long-term response to the objective of security of supply with the assurances of a near-complete control of radioactive residues. The goal is to promote a more responsible alternative than the competing “open fuel cycle” option, which treats irradiated fuel as waste to be stored (
The technocratic representation of the irradiated material treatment network is, thus, the bearer of what I call an “imaginary ecology”, which substitutes the representation of a fantasized power over matter for the real mediation relations between the industrial activity and the environment in which it is inscribed. However, if the Simondonian perspective allows us to bring this discrepancy to light, it leaves us somewhat baffled as to the interpretation of the political, social, and economic motivations that dictate its establishment and maintenance. Why is the French nuclear industry so keen on its imaginary ecology?
Understanding and criticizing imaginaries
Simondon's sociopolitical shortcomings
From the perspective of sociological analysis, the Simondonian theory suffers from a form of abstraction. It provides, through the worker-organizer-technician tripartition, a fixed and idealized model of the organization of the industry born in the 19th century. In practice, however, these three groups are rarely well distinguished. Organizers include technicians who are responsible for designing and building the ensembles that inscribe their power in physical facilities. Since the CEA had engineers who were properly trained in the technical constraints specific to nuclear energy, it was able to assert its policy, which involved the construction of plutonium plants, from the 1950s onwards (
This idealized figure of the technician is tied to a deeper problem. For Simondon, it is the technique itself (once understood in its own constitutive principles) that provides the standard whereby a critique of social organization can be made. The issue is, therefore, to know which technical point of view provides this right representation of technique and, thus, to know who can act as arbitrator. This problem appears in a later text by Simondon, in which it is specifically addressed as a matter of nuclear technology
STS methods have been developed in part to counteract such misunderstandings. To the idealized norms of science and technology resulting from the constructions of epistemologists, their investigations intend to substitute a representation of science and technology in the process; to the figure of the scientist or the technician accessing the objective nature of things by virtue of his or her disinterestedness, they substitute an elucidation of the socio-political logics in which the work of scientific and technical communities is immersed. This descriptive approach has a critical dimension, in that it allows us to take a step back from the industry’s self-presentation, legitimization, and mobilization discourses. I will now focus on an example of this type of approach.
Surgénération and Jasanoff's sociotechnical imaginaries
Among the many analytical frameworks that have been developed in STS, the sociotechnical imaginaries approach, formulated by historian Sheila Jasanoff, is one of the most effective to study cases like this (
At the end of the Second World War, the United States mobilized, in the management of its nuclear industry, an imaginary centered around the notion of containment. This notion defined the “atom” as a controllable and pacified entity. The country, in return, assumed the image of a responsible regulator of a technology that could always get out of control. This imaginary has been mobilized throughout the history of the American nuclear industry both at the level of international relations (by describing other nuclear-powered countries, particularly the USSR, as irresponsible powers) and at the national level (by providing a repertoire of legal norms to contain the fears concerning a loss of control over radioactivity).
The case of South Korea is different, in that the sociotechnical imaginary of the nuclear industry is articulated around the notion of atoms for national development. After the Japanese occupation and the separation of the two Koreas, South Korea intends to develop the atom to assure its national energy capacity and, thus, its independence. This issue will play a role in its relationship with the main exporting country: the United States. This imaginary will also be mobilized in national politics by providing a repertoire from which political frameworks of representation were formulated, at the time of its democratic transition in the 1980s, to include citizens in a national development program. This program was later criticized because of its antidemocratic management.
It is easy to see how this concept offers an interpretation frame for the case that interests us. Surgénération provides the technological keystone of the imaginary energy independence through which the French nuclear industry—public or semi-public companies (EDF and Cogéma), government agencies (CEA and safety), the government (ministries of industry and finance), and the private sector—motivated the massive investments it required, despite sometimes deep divisions. These investments, only profitable in the medium term, were going to offer a long-term alternative to importing raw materials that could suffocate the national economy
The “radioactive matter” category included in the French Environmental Code in 2006 is currently a legal expression of this long-lived imaginary: it categorizes most industrial residues as likely to be used for energy recovery. At stake again is the maintenance of an imaginary energy independence, in which the industry is organized around the long-term goal of supplying (and, thus, of containing) an energy material available on national territory. The current difficulties faced by this program are also consistent with this interpretation. The abandonment of the ASTRID (the latest prototype of an FBR) project in 2019 is interpreted by certain actors, notably at the CEA site, as the result of a conflict between, on the one hand, the current policy of the government and the industry, which is defined in terms of short-term financial objectives, and, on the other hand, the State’s planning role and its adherence to a public service ideology necessary for the success of such a project
An analytical framework such as this one can, thus, account for the social and political dimensions of the imaginaries in which technical projects are immersed. It also makes it possible to deconstruct the idealized image that the communities in charge of these projects give of themselves. Yet this description obscures a key aspect of the Simondonian analysis that I proposed earlier: the gap between the imagined and technocratic representation of technique as a power over nature and the technical operations that it aims to mobilize. Of course, the illusory character of the sociotechnical imaginary is implicit in Jasanoff's analysis: although the “atom” as a mastered entity, for example, is indeed a form of symbolic reduction in relation to the series of facilities on which the nuclear industry is based, this is not made explicit. STS investigations often refuse to enter this field because they reject the normative approach of epistemology. However, it seems to me that we can certainly take the critique a step further and not only examine the social logics at work in the formation of imaginaries but also explicitly criticize their illusory nature with the help of a conceptual analysis.
How to analyze the imaginary? STS and epistemology of techniques
Is the analysis through sociotechnical imaginaries complementary to the Simondonian approach that we have proposed? The answer to this question requires an epistemological reflection, which can be centered around the notion of the imaginary. On the one hand, the Simondonian approach makes it possible to reveal the imaginary dimension of the discourses on “surgénération”, i.e., to show that they are, at least partly, the result of a cognitive illusion maintained by the organization of the industry. On the other hand, Jasanoff's analysis allows us to demonstrate the active role of imagination in the definition of national industrial policies and, therefore, their material effectiveness in this same organization of the industry. These two dimensions coexist within the concept of the imaginary. We can refer here to
The imaginary ecology of the nuclear industry structures communities by dictating a common planning horizon for all stakeholders in an industry marked by competition and recurrent conflicts (
The construction of a complementarity between these two approaches meets a difficulty that must be explained to prevent it from being reduced to a simple superficial juxtaposition of two approaches. Jasanoff's analysis of the imaginary is essentially explanatory and descriptive: it entails giving an account of technical and scientific projects by bringing their sociopolitical motivations to light. The Simondonian analysis that I have proposed is normative, in that it intends to provide theoretical tools to identify and criticize the conceptual gaps between technical ensembles and their technocratic representation. In this sense, it conveys a form of critical epistemology of technology from which two presuppositions can be made explicit.
Firstly, it suggests that not all representations of technology have the same truth value. The gap between the conception of the promoters of the nuclear industry and the understanding of ensembles found in the literature on safety cannot be reduced to a simple difference between two incommensurable ontologies. The latter is truer than the former, especially in that it is nourished by investigations into the actual functioning of facilities. This comparison in terms of truth value allows us to reinvest, in a more flexible manner, the norm proposed by Simondon: the Simondonian technician is not the disinterested point of view from which a perfect description of technique would be stated but an ideal norm, susceptible to redefinition, towards which investigations must tend
Secondly, it implies that technology cannot be dissolved in politics. We must distinguish between, on the one hand, the empirical observation of a co-construction or continuity (which STS studies document and analyze) and, on the other hand, the theoretical ambition of reducing technical objects to the status of sociopolitical agents like any other. This anti-reductionist perspective
This article would not have seen the light of day without the benevolent help of many people. My reflection on the articulation between philosophy and STS is mainly due to the fact that I find myself humanly linked to these two disciplines. I would like to thank Sophie Roux and Soraya Boudia for their help and suggestions. I am also grateful to the communities of young researchers in philosophy and STS, who reviewed and discussed early drafts of this article. On the STS side, I am thinking in particular of Claire Le Renard, Gauthier Fontaine, Laura Barbier, Maël Goumri, Martin Denoun, and Mathias Roger. On the philosophy side, I think in particular of Arto Charpentier, Benoit Lépinat, Louis Pijaudier-Cabot, Lucie Fabry, and Samuel Ducourant.