Received: June 12, 2024
Accepted: August 12, 2024
This paper explores the intersection between the extended mind thesis and transhumanism, with a particular focus on how technology may influence, alter, or enhance human cognitive abilities. The extended mind thesis posits that external elements can become integral components of cognitive processes. Drawing on this notion, the paper contends that transhumanism adopts such perspective in advocating for the possibility of cognitive enhancement. In this sense, it assesses whether technology can truly improve cognitive function or whether it might, instead, induce a specific type of ignorance by diminishing cognitive phenomenology—the lived, experiential dimension of mental processes or the phenomenal aspect of cognitive consciousness. The assumption that cognitive technologies inherently enhance independent mental performance is challenged, with the argument that overreliance on technology may impair the ability to execute cognitive tasks autonomously. The analysis concludes that the integration of technological artifacts with human cognition can indeed lead to a specific form of ignorance by compromising cognitive phenomenology. It also suggests that such ignorance signals that the excessive use of technology may undermine the ability to perform cognitive tasks independently. These two conclusions invite reconsideration of the transhumanist claim that technology can improve human cognition.
Keywords: technological advances, cognitive phenomenology, ignorance, extended mind, transhumanism.
El artículo explora la intersección entre la tesis de la mente extendida y el transhumanismo, enfocándose, específicamente, en cómo las tecnologías pueden influir, alterar o expandir nuestras capacidades y habilidades cognitivas. A través de un análisis de la tesis de la mente extendida, que propone que algunos elementos externos pueden formar parte constitutiva de nuestros procesos cognitivos, se argumenta que el transhumanismo adopta dicha tesis al tratar el asunto del mejoramiento cognitivo, y se examina si la tecnología puede realmente mejorar nuestras capacidades mentales, o si, por el contrario, podría inducir a un tipo específico de ignorancia al hacernos perder la fenomenología cognitiva, es decir, la vivencia de nuestros procesos mentales o el aspecto fenoménico de nuestra conciencia cognitiva. Se cuestiona, además, si el acoplamiento con tecnologías cognitivas disminuiría nuestra capacidad de realizar tareas mentales de forma autónoma, sugiriendo que una dependencia excesiva de la tecnología podría reducir nuestra habilidad para realizar procesos cognitivos sin ayuda de artefactos tecnológicos. Luego del análisis, el artículo concluye que, efectivamente, nuestro acoplamiento con artefactos tecnológicos puede conducirnos a un tipo específico de ignorancia al eliminar nuestra fenomenología cognitiva. También determina que dicha ignorancia es síntoma de que el uso excesivo de tecnologías puede despojarnos de nuestra habilidad de realizar tareas cognitivas sin asistencia tecnológica. Estas dos conclusiones deberían minar, o al menos replantear, las aspiraciones transhumanistas acerca del mejoramiento tecnológico de nuestra mente.
Palabras clave: avances tecnológicos, fenomenología cognitiva, ignorancia, mente extendida, transhumanismo.
In his novel Fahrenheit 451,
We're book burners, too. We read the books and burnt them, afraid they’d be found. Microfilming didn’t pay off; we were always traveling, we didn’t want to bury the film and come back later. Always the chance of discovery. Better to keep it in the old heads, where no one can see it or suspect it. We are all bits and pieces of history and literature and international law, Byron, Tom Paine, Machiavelli or Christ, it’s here. (Bradbury, 2012, p. 167 )
This passage alludes to a key feature of our cognitive processes that may be lost due to
the increasing reliance on technology. Although difficult to recognize sometimes, this feature is exactly
what this paper seeks to highlight. In the literature, such feature has been referred to as cognitive
phenomenology (
In order to achieve this goal, the following section analyzes how transhumanism embraces the ideal of cognitive enhancement. Next, the extended mind thesis is discussed as a strong argumentative foundation for the transhumanist ideal of cognitive enhancement. Finally, it is demonstrated that this thesis can, in certain cases, lead to diminished cognitive phenomenology, resulting in a specific form of ignorance.
The enhancement of cognition is one of the most cherished goals of the transhumanist
movement.
T1. Every human weakness can be enhanced and even overcome using modern technology.
T2. The human species as a whole can be enhanced and even surpassed using modern technology.
In addition, transhumanism seems to support a third thesis of an ethical nature:
T3. The human species has a moral duty to enhance and even surpass itself using technology.
This article addresses the first two theses, which are more metaphysical than ethical.
However, some points raised here may have an impact on transhumanism’s ethical stance.
Transhumanists take humanism further by challenging human limits by means of science and technology combined with critical and creative thinking. We challenge the inevitability of aging and death, and we seek continuing enhancements to our intellectual abilities, our physical capacities, and our emotional development. We see humanity as a transitory stage in the evolutionary development of intelligence. We advocate using science to accelerate our move from human to a transhuman or posthuman condition.
The pursuit of overcoming human limits through technology covers various aspects of
humanity, utilizing different means to achieve this purpose. These include the use of nanotechnology and
biotechnology, the development of genetic alteration techniques, and the creation of technological devices
that function as prosthetics for the human body. These means seek to enhance longevity, enhance health,
eliminate motor and cognitive diseases, explore new ways of engaging cognitively with reality, or optimize
physical and biological resources for performing different tasks (
The cognitive aspect of transhumanism seems to have two distinct versions (
For this scenario to truly represent an enhancement, it is essential not only to develop
artificial intelligence but also to integrate it with human intelligence. This integration is envisioned
as the possibility of uploading the human mind—thoughts, emotions, memories, and other mental states—to a
medium outside the human body. Consequently, humans could “exist” within a machine, which would allow
human cognition to transcend the physical limitations of the body and elevate mental states beyond the
current, fragile cognitive capacity (
The second, less radical version of cognitive transhumanism does not focus on the total transfer of human minds to machines. Instead, it is based on the ideal of hybridization between the organic and the technological. The concept of the cyborg is key to this version, where the organic does not disappear but is transformed through a complex interaction with technological tools. Devices such as implants, prosthetics, and other artifacts installed in the human body would enhance both living conditions and cognitive abilities.
The idea of creating superintelligence and transferring the human mind into a machine
seems difficult to materialize. First, there are widespread criticisms regarding the feasibility of
developing strong artificial intelligence. Although such criticisms are not directed at transhumanism,
they do challenge one of its key assumptions: the potential for general artificial intelligence. Notable
examples include Searle’s famous Chinese room argument (1980) or the well-known arguments referencing
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem to assert the impossibility of strong artificial intelligence (
The extended mind thesis, proposed by
The extended mind thesis suggests that cognitive processes do not necessarily occur
within human heads. Instead, these processes can extend into the world through interaction with external
objects that, together with the human brain and nervous system, form cognitive systems.
The central idea is that cognitive processes do not always occur within the human mind;
they can involve coupled systems that incorporate both intracranial and extracranial elements
working together to perform cognitive tasks. For example, logical deductions can be intracranial
processes, but using pencil and paper can facilitate calculations, as taught in basic logic courses.
Pencil and paper do not serve as a mere physical representation of what the mind has already deduced;
they become part of a system coupled with internal elements that, together, perform the
logical deductions. This dynamic is also applicable to cognitive processes such as searching,
analyzing, and predicting. While these processes can be internally performed, they often benefit from
the integration of external elements. To illustrate extended cognitive processes,
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (p. 8)
Thus, if tasks like deducing, calculating, searching, predicting, recognizing, and understanding are readily labeled as cognitive processes when performed mentally, we can continue to categorize them as such when they result from a coupling between elements of the external world and elements inside our heads. Therefore, it can be concluded that, sometimes, cognitive processes can be extended to objects in the world.
While the most prominent transhumanists may not explicitly reference the extended mind
thesis to support their views on cognitive enhancement, their statements often implicitly suggest an
underlying acceptance of it. For example,
What is new is the growing interest in creating intimate links between the external systems and the human user through better interaction. The software becomes less an external tool and more of a mediating “exoself.” This can be achieved through mediation, embedding the human within an augmenting “shell” such as wearable computers or virtual reality, or through smart environments in which objects are given extended capabilities. (p. 320)
This passage illustrates how using technological hybridization in the transhumanist
pursuit of cognitive enhancement seems to tacitly assume the extended mind thesis applied to cognitive
processes. The idea that cognitive processes are enhanced through technology holds true only to the extent
that the boundaries between the human and the technological blur. Other prominent transhumanists make
similar observations without directly referencing the extended mind thesis (
What is the new extension of mind proposed by transhumanism? It is the consideration that the extension of mind through external networks, of one type or another, can always be done directly, without the intervention of an interface. Thus, the computer and man, the human mind, would form a single system, without the mediation of interfaces. It would be the appearance of the «man machine». (p. 451)
In this sense, since there would be no causal mediation between the mind and the artifact, transhumanists would be aiming to create cognitive units that integrate the biological subject with the technological artifact in such a way that cognitive processes could be extended. Hence, cognitive extension is “direct,” and for that reason, transhumanists prefer the concept of coupling rather than integration. Once this concept is accepted, it should also be noted that any technological enhancement of the artifacts extending our cognitive processes would consequently enhance those processes. The argument would have the following structure:
1) If the mind can be extended into external objects, then cognitive behavior will rely on coupling with those objects that form the cognitive system.
2) If cognitive behavior relies on coupling with the objects that constitute the cognitive system, then enhancing the objects in the cognitive circuit will lead to a cognitive enhancement of the system.
3) If the mind can be extended into external objects, then enhancing the objects of the cognitive circuit will imply a cognitive enhancement of the system (follows from 1 and 2).
4) The mind can be extended into external objects (extended mind thesis).
5) Therefore, enhancing the objects within the cognitive circuit will result in a cognitive enhancement of the system (follows from 3 and 4).
Thus, the extended mind thesis would support the transhumanist ideal that the mind and cognition can be enhanced through technology. Specifically, the thesis supports the weaker version of cybernetic transhumanism, which advocates for technological hybridization to transcend our biological cognitive limits.
Does every form of coupling lead to cognitive enhancement? First, embracing the extended
mind thesis—applied to cognitive processes and understood as the potential for a coupled
circuit—it could be argued that it is independent of current advancements in technology. If the
thesis is true, the extension of cognitive processes into objects would reflect a capacity that
humankind has possessed for thousands of years. The use of pencil and paper to perform abstract
mathematical operations, a compass to determine location, specific tools to measure distances, and even
language are examples of what the extension of the mind entails at the cognitive process level. The mind
is not exclusively extended through robotic prostheses, computers, and futuristic artifacts. The human
mind is extended every second. The use of cave signs, papyrus, or a laptop only differs in
sophistication, not in qualitative changes that enhance or transcend the limitations of a previously
existing form of cognition. In this regard, the extended mind thesis may not necessarily provide a
conceptual foundation that reinforces transhumanist ideals (
The remainder of this paper will not focus on this type of criticism. Instead, it will be
assumed that the extended mind thesis can support cognitive enhancement in certain cases. However,
attention should be paid to specific instances where human interaction with technological artifacts may
result in forms of ignorance. It is not a black-and-white scenario. Technology does not always
guarantee cognitive enhancement that can even surpass human biological limits—as transhumanists
claim—nor can it be stated that technology always leads to a loss or detriment in human
cognition—as some techno-pessimists might point out. It is important to consider the analyses by
There is increasing concern regarding the rise of generative artificial intelligences
such as ChatGPT (
If we hand over too many tasks to AI systems, and we therefore have fewer occasions or incentives to develop our capacity for intelligence, then there is a risk that we might end up being less intelligent than we could otherwise be. If we assign to AI technologies many of our intelligence-requiring tasks, rather than engaging in these tasks ourselves, and instead rely heavily on AI technologies, the increased dependence could prevent some people from fully realizing their intellectual potential. (p. 80)
The issue appears to be that successful cognitive extension could result in a decline of
human biological or natural intellectual capacity. Examples of this phenomenon include the fact that to
remember certain information, people no longer appeal to their biological memory, but to their smartphone.
Similarly, when trying to locate a specific place, people rely on GPS technology rather than their own
navigation skills. Likewise, ChatGPT might discourage writing production, as some individuals may have
fewer opportunities to practice their writing skills. In short, a high reliance on technological artifacts
might indicate successful cognitive extension, but also a decline in natural abilities.
P1) The more we are reliant on extended cognitive processes, the less we employ our purely on-board cognitive processes.
P2) The less we employ our purely on-board cognitive processes, the less epistemically effective they are.
P3) The less epistemically effective our purely on-board cognitive processes are, the less we acquire epistemic standings like knowledge and true belief from these sources.
C1) The more we are reliant on extended cognitive processes, the less we acquire epistemic standings like knowledge and true belief from our purely on-board cognitive processes (from P1, P2, and P3).
P4) Ignorance is to be understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, such as the lack of knowledge or the lack of true belief.
C2) The less we acquire epistemic standings like knowledge and true belief from our purely on-board cognitive processes, the more susceptible we are to being ignorant (From C1 and P4). (p. 62)
Returning to the case of Fahrenheit 451, excessive reliance on technological artifacts could undermine human ability to remember independently. As Granger points out to Montag, the best course of action in their situation would be to memorize all the books they are trying to protect. However, this capacity would be diminished if they relied on microfilms or other artifacts for storing that information. While microfilm could facilitate successful cognitive extension, excessive reliance on it could impair the human ability to remember. Increased dependence on external aids risks ignorance by reducing stimulation for natural faculties.
In response to this argument,
Cognitive enhancement is assured even if humans no longer rely on natural or purely biological cognitive processes, as coupling with external artifacts enhances epistemic trust, leading to knowledge and true beliefs within the coupled circuit. Only by rejecting the extended mind thesis can it be claimed that technological dependence fosters ignorance. Nevertheless, once we acknowledge the extension of epistemic credit, it becomes illogical to suggest that humans are more prone to ignorance when the technological extension of their cognitive processes has occurred. Humans are not more ignorant for using pencil and paper to perform calculations, nor does Watson cease to have true beliefs simply because Holmes informs him of how he uncovered a crime scene. Therefore, it makes no sense to claim that humans lack knowledge or true beliefs because they rely on technology to perform cognitive tasks. Thus, this type of argument would not undermine the transhumanist ideal of cognitive enhancement.
According to the extended mind thesis, it should not be assumed that the objects and tools that assist in cognitive tasks are doing the work for humans. What occurs is the establishment of tightly coupled cognitive systems in which the absence of any one component can compromise the entire cognitive process. This is what the authors call an extension of epistemic credit: the acquisition of knowledge is not solely attributable to the subject’s internal biological capacity, but the tool used in the cognitive process also deserves credit. However, it can be argued that, at times, rather than an extension of epistemic credit, there is a “shift” of epistemic credit, with all the merit falling on the technological tool and not on any biological aspect of the knowing subject. These are the cases in which Pritchard claims that ignorance is absent because true belief and knowledge remain intact. What he requires is a specific form of ignorance that results from cognitive extension. To achieve this, it may be necessary to revise P4, especially the definition of ignorance, since it is restricted to the absence of knowledge and true belief.
The process of extending cognitive capacity is likely to result in the subsequent
inability of the agent to perform the task “on their own.” The loss of natural cognitive capacities is
tantamount to saying that the task of thinking is outsourced to technological devices. To that extent,
individuals might stop thinking for themselves. Once responsibility for human cognitive activities is
delegated to technological tools, individuals may lose the first-person authority that defines their
mental states and activities. Cognitive tasks can still be completed, but they are no longer under the
individual’s control. Ultimately, with total delegation of cognitive tasks, individuals lose the
experiential dimension that accompanies intellectual activities, which may result in phenomenologically
inferior cognition. But what exactly does this mean? In the literature, an aspect that accompanies
thinking activities has been referred to as cognitive phenomenology, which can be defined as
“the experience associated with cognitive activities such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding” (
Just as there is an experience of “what is like to be a bat”, there is also an experience
of being an individual who deduces, calculates, searches, understands, and so on. Cognitive activity is
thus accompanied by this cognitive phenomenology, which some thinkers argue is irreducible to other
sensations or experiences derived from our senses (
One of the arguments supporting the existence of cognitive phenomenology is particularly relevant to the discussion of the transhumanist ideal of cognitive enhancement. It is known as the contrast argument. Strawson’s (2009) version is worthy of presentation here, as it is related to the understanding a foreign language. Consider two subjects, A and B: A is a native English speaker, while B is a native Spanish speaker. They both hear an utterance of a sentence in Spanish: “Ladran, Sancho, señal que cabalgamos.” Both A and B share the experience of hearing the utterance, yet there is an experiential difference. While B comprehends the meaning, A finds it unintelligible. Hence, there is an experience of being like someone who understands Spanish—a cognitive phenomenology of linguistic comprehension. In this case, A lacks that phenomenology, while B does not. This kind of experiential ignorance of cognition can be defined as a lack of awareness of the cognitive phenomenology involved in an activity, such as understanding a sentence in Spanish.
Strawson’s argument can also be applied to consider a case where A uses an IA translator to ascertain the meaning of the sentence “Ladran, Sancho, señal que cabalgamos.” Even if A gains the knowledge or true belief regarding the meaning, they still lack the experiential understanding of the sentence in Spanish. Although A benefits from cognitive extension by using the translator, which prevents them from lacking knowledge or true belief about the utterance’s meaning, they remain unaware of the experience of being like someone who understands that sentence in Spanish. Thus, the same can be said of any excessive or complete transfer of cognitive tasks to technological tools.
The cognitive phenomenology linked to performing cognitive tasks—which may be diminished
in certain instances of successful extension—also signifies that the task was accomplished through the
individual’s own effort. In the context of a task that has been entirely delegated, it makes no sense to
suggest that the individual acting in isolation can claim credit for the task. In the aforementioned case,
the fact that A lacks the experience of understanding an utterance in Spanish implies that they cannot
take credit for knowing the meaning of the sentence, even when using a translator to ascertain it. Several
distinct cases merit consideration: a native Spanish speaker, a native English speaker who is also a
Spanish translator, an English speaker learning Spanish, and an English speaker with no familiarity with
the language. Both the translator and the individual learning Spanish may consult a dictionary or a AI
translator to assist them with certain expressions. In such cases, it can be pointed out that they
experience what it is like to be someone who understands the sentence. Cognitive phenomenology is evident
in both instances, where cognitive extension expands epistemic credit. However, in the case of
the fourth subject, although there is cognitive extension, epistemic credit has not been
expanded but rather completely delegated. When cognitive extension occurs but
epistemic credit is entirely delegated, ignorance of certain cognitive phenomenology can
arise: the experience of performing a cognitive task independently is unknown.
That sense of ownership over human cognitive activities is a key aspect of cognition, which can be undermined by the pervasive presence of technological tools. This concept is illustrated in the Bradbury quote that opened this paper. As Granger observed, the preservation of books relies on biological memory rather than on attempts to “extend” cognition through microfilm or any other artifact. The character points out that this is the only way to keep the books safe. The cognitive phenomenology of intellectual activity emerges as a crucial aspect to be safeguarded against the potential risks of extending human cognition into the external world. Otherwise, transhumanist motivations could diminish the individual’s experience rather than enhance their cognitive abilities.
This paper argues that the extended mind thesis—when applied to cognitive processes and understood in terms of coupling—serves as a conceptual basis that transhumanists must implicitly or explicitly adopt. Cognition is a crucial aspect that transhumanists aim to enhance through technology, favoring the hybridization between organic and artificial elements as a primary means to achieve this goal. The extended mind thesis aligns seamlessly with this enhancement approach, as it advocates for the formation of coupled cognitive circuits that grant epistemic credit to the entire system by integrating both biological and artificial elements. However, it has been argued that when epistemic credit is entirely delegated rather than merely extended, a specific form of ignorance can arise: the loss of cognitive phenomenology that accompanies human cognitive activities. This loss indicates that, once a cognitive task has been delegated, the individual will no longer be able to perform that task independently. In contrast to Pritchard, who contends that coupling with external objects eliminates the possibility of ignorance—defined as a lack of knowledge and true belief—this paper posits that an additional form of ignorance can emerge even when cognitive extension is successful. This ignorance pertains to the experience of being someone who performs cognitive task X, thereby affecting the understanding of what it truly means to engage in X.
This perspective should not be seen as techno-pessimistic; rather, it conveys a healthy skepticism toward techno-optimism. The fact that technological extension can lead to a form of ignorance does not imply an inherently undesirable situation. For instance, the invention of writing, much to Socrates’ dismay, eliminated certain cognitive phenomenologies he deemed essential for nurturing thought. Nevertheless, writing has introduced new ways of thinking that might have never been encountered without its development. An additional task will be to determine criteria that help us identify which areas may be worthwhile to remain ignorant of, thereby guiding ideals might be transhumanist.
The author would like to thank Juan Camilo Toro and Daniel Duarte for their comments on previous versions of this manuscript. He also appreciates the feedback from the peer reviewers.
The author declares that neither this paper nor the research that led to it incurs any financial, professional, or personal conflict of interest.