Is Technology Good or Bad in Itself? An Intentionalist–Dispositional Approach
Abstract
This article reopens the question of the moral neutrality of technology and maintains that artefacts are not indifferent to value: they embody moral orientations at the intersection between design intention and dispositions that are effectively fixed in the world. The thesis is made more precise by showing how artefacts configure probabilities of action with ethical relevance, and by discussing objections—including the role of chance and the externalist perspective on use—to clarify what it means for something to be “good” or “bad” in a literal-moral sense. The study of automatic emotion recognition illustrates that a system becomes problematic when its epistemic basis is weak, its categories reduce what is human, and the dispositions it introduces tend to cause harm in high-risk contexts. By contrast, good designs are those that, according to the defended framework, are robust (they hold up under variation and unanticipated cases), flexible (they allow adjustment and correction without breaking their purpose), and transparent (they make assumptions, data, and limits intelligible), and, above all, they align the intended value with the embedded value and the realized value. Bad designs are those that, as in the analysed case, rest on fragile epistemic assumptions, fix reductive dispositions, and produce systematically undesirable effects. From this, it follows that technological morality is decided in design, which justifies redesigning or, in certain cases, not deploying.
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