Do Technological Devices Direct Human Actions? A Praxeological Outlook

Abstract

In today's society, people's use of technological devices does not seem intentional, but directed by the device itself. As this situation is common, this article seeks to answer the question of whether technological devices guide human actions. A qualitative approach methodological framework is used, starting with a review of the background represented by the positions of John Searle, Martin Heidegger and Bruno Latour. Afterwards, the fundamental bibliography of Antonio González-Fernández is reviewed in order to select some praxeological premises, and to establish a position on the matter, based on the concept of reality, which he calls alterity, related to technological devices, inasmuch as they are real things that can affect human actions. The results show that technological devices do not direct human actions, a matter that corresponds to the structures of praxis known as action and activity. Thus, the praxeological posture is neither mere intentionalism nor pure mastery of the technique, much less a synthesis of both positions. Rather, the coexistence of human intentionality and the influence of the technological devices may be proposed, which, as something real, affects human beings and forces them to respond to their real presence. In this way, the most important philosophical implication consists in deriving a praxeological position that overcomes the limitations of its predecessors.